Estatica Das Estruturas Humberto Soriano Pdf 12
there is nothing new in the report as a whole – the situation has already been described in understandable terms, it’s just that updating is not required and, therefore, remains covered in the darkness of uncertainty. the same thing is repeated over and over again. Well, what can you do, it’s boring to live in the world, gentlemen, if literature is not able to utter a single kind word about the person who blinded the minaret. this is where it gets weird. it would not be superfluous, if anyone will. especially for a person with scientific regalia. In addition, the text has an excellent prehistory:
When I began to study political philosophy (in the early 1990s), I discovered that an extra-scientific tradition also dominates in this area. We were in the thrall of what is called a â€œcounterâ€ theory of knowledge, but in fact it is a conservative version of the philosophy of science. The essence of this theory is as follows: the methodology of science is not science, and the knowledge obtained in this way is by no means scientific. On the other hand, science is an object of study (analysis, diagnostics, description, forecast, design), and not a subject (researcher).
But nevertheless, when I began to try to define what science is, it turned out to be difficult, because no matter what the meaning, everything is â€œmethodologyâ€. It is clear that sooner or later we would come to the need to consider the philosophy of science, but this would not be the first attempt, and at this stage I was not ready to do it.
In fact, all major philosophical problems are somehow related to knowledge and science, which means that every time we try to define what science is, we are, in principle, referring to the most fundamental problem of philosophy. This problem is formulated at the very beginning of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Kant speaks of “pure representation” as something that is given to knowledge immediately, which characterizes the very form of knowledge. Here